

9 May 1966

Mr. MORSE. I know that the Senator in his speech pointed out some of the techniques involved in the entire subject of literacy courses that could be conducted by television and, to some extent, even by radio or by visual aid. I think that we should try to do that. I do not think that we should wait to attack the literacy problem in Latin America until we develop the U.S. domestic aspect of the President's international education program, although I am all for that.

The Senator mentioned universities and intelligence agencies in a section of his speech. It so happens that last week, at Wayne State University, I spoke at an institute sponsored by four universities. But those who came to the institute came from all over the United States. The president of the institute is Prof. John Gange of the University of Oregon. It is a large group of political scientists.

I was asked to lecture on the very subject matter that the Senator from New York has covered in this part of his speech dealing with universities and intelligence agencies.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed at the conclusion of my remarks the lecture that I gave at Wayne University on the night of May 5, in which lecture I discussed the subject that the Senator from New York has raised in his speech.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. MORSE. I said in the first paragraph of the lecture:

It has been suggested that I talk to this meeting on the subject of the gap between academic research and foreign policy. But at the risk of being topical and taking a short-term view, I would rather talk about a factor in this relationship which worries me much more. It is the extent to which academic research and opinions about foreign policy are polluted by Government sponsorship.

I discussed Camelot in the lecture. I discussed the situation that had developed at MIT, and in that respect I pointed out that in the late fifties our subcommittee—and President Kennedy was then a Senator from Massachusetts on my subcommittee—\$150,000 had been appropriated by the Senate for the subcommittee to make a study of United States-Latin American relations grow-

ing out of unfavorable incidents in Latin America.

Similarly the full committee had undertaken a study of the foreign aid program, using the same system of contracting to many academic individuals and institutes.

The first proposal of the Senate was that there be an investigation of our Latin American policy in 1958. I asked that it be changed to a study instead of an investigation. I then moved in the committee that the \$150,000, or most of it, be used to enter into contracts with universities, research foundations, and centers of recognized authorities on Latin America to have them prepare for us a series of monographs that would be helpful to use to set forth the findings of fact and the recommendations as to what Congress and the administration should do in regard to possible changes in foreign policy.

The then Senator Kennedy from Massachusetts seconded my motion and made a strong supporting speech urging its adoption. The Committee on Foreign Relations unanimously adopted the procedural recommendations.

It was out of those studies and recommendations—as President Kennedy told me on several occasions that he took them to the White House when he went there—that he went to work and formulated the great Kennedy Alliance for Progress program.

One of those studies for the full Committee on Foreign Aid was prepared by MIT. I want to say on the floor of the Senate today that it was a good study. It was prepared by men at MIT who were competent to prepare it. But as I pointed out in my lecture the other night at Wayne University, we did not know that the division of MIT that conducted the study came into creation under a CIA grant. We do not know today how many more of the studies on foreign aid and Latin America were done by academic or private agencies subsidized by CIA, AID, and the Defense Department.

I do not think, at least when the contracts are let as we let that contract, that such an obvious fact should be kept from us.

I pointed out in the lecture that as a result of what has really developed now, not only in the academic world but also outside of the academic world, we should let the reader beware, let the public beware, let Congress beware, and let all of us beware of these studies that are recommended out of the universities unless we know where the funds come from to finance the center or the professor making the study.

I do not think that Congress should continue to support the CIA, and I said in my lecture, the Defense Department and also the State Department, in financing, undisclosed to the people and to the country, these so-called academic research studies because they make them suspect, and they are bound to be suspect.

The Senator from New York said that he would give some thought as to how this type of work should be done, and I am all for that. The Senator suggested the State Department—and that may be most appropriate—in reply to the Sen-

ator from Oklahoma (Mr. HARRIS), stating also that he had given some thought to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. That should be studied further. But I think there is another suggestion, to which I have been giving a considerable amount of thought, that needs to be considered. I am not so sure that we should not set up a national foundation of international research study somewhat in the format of a National Science Foundation, and we have a whole series of Federal foundations.

I am not so sure, in order to guarantee their independence, to guarantee their objectivity, to free them from any suspicion that they may be connected with the CIA or the Defense Department or the State Department, and therefore their point of view may not be completely objective, but that we ought to have an independent foundation to conduct what should be independent studies. But I have reached no final conclusion about it. I am happy that the Senator from New York spoke out on this matter, because he knows, as I know, that the academic world is greatly disturbed. I wish he could have seen the reaction I received from outstanding scholars in this country following my lecture the other night, when they came up and said they were sure I had no idea of the great controversy going on within the academic world today because of the views held by many about these federally financed research studies, whether by the American University in this city, or Michigan State University, or Massachusetts Institute of Technology—which, as the Senator mentioned, has now discontinued its past relationships with CIA because of the criticism it was arousing. They said, "If you knew how we really feel, you will know how welcome your remarks were here tonight. The Federal Government ought to follow a procedural course of action that will take America's universities out of the realm of the suspect."

And they are suspect today. We have a right, now, when we receive a report from any American university relating in any way to the American military or the American foreign policy, to ask the simple questions, "Who finances your center or program? What were your instructions? What review was your report subject to?"

As an old academic man myself, I commend the Senator from New York on what he has said on that subject, because I am sure he will find that that part of his speech will exercise a terrific impact on American academic life.

One further word. I wish to say that at the beginning, it was never contemplated that the Alliance for Progress program should be a military aid program. The military aspects of our aid to Latin America were never intended, in the first place, to be encompassed in the Alliance for Progress program. I think that is very important, and I stress it again today.

Yes, a certain amount of military aid will be needed. But we have too many leaders in some Latin American countries who seem to think the greatest weapon we can send them for meeting

the challenge of communism is military aid. It is my opinion that the military aid we have sent them has, in many instances, played into the hands of the Communist threat in Latin America, rather than tending to subdue it.

Whatever the views of others may be, I only wish to say, as I close, what I said at the beginning: the Senator has made a speech this afternoon which updates the Alliance for Progress. It is a most appropriate speech to be read in connection with the last speech on the subject made by President Kennedy, and I hope all Members of Congress and officials in the State Department, the Pentagon, and the CIA, as well as the leaders of the Latin American countries, will read the Senator's speech, contemplate it, and comprehend it; and then see what can be done to carry out the great idealism it expresses.

The Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. HARRIS] spoke of idealism as being pragmatic. I know of nothing that is more pragmatic than an ideal put to work. That is all the Senator has asked for in his speech. We have some great ideals in this country in the field of foreign policy. However, of late we seem to have given them an opiate; they are not alive, not vigorous. They are asleep. I hope the Senator's speech will serve to awaken some of them, because that is what I interpret its purpose to be.

EXHIBIT 1

REMARKS OF SENATOR WAYNE MORSE, INTERNATIONAL STUDIES ASSOCIATION, WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY, DETROIT, MICH., MAY 5, 1966

It has been suggested that I talk to this meeting on the subject of the gap between academic research and foreign policy. But at the risk of being topical and taking a short-term view, I would rather talk about a factor in this relationship which worries me much more. It is the extent to which academic research and opinions about foreign policy are polluted by Government sponsorship.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has recently concluded a series of hearings on the Vietnam war and China policy in an unprecedented effort to ventilate ideas and opinions that will go beyond official policy on these subjects. It was especially true in the case of China that we relied heavily upon academicians, since the absence of trade, cultural, tourist, and political relations narrowly confines the extent of public knowledge and expertise about mainland China.

No State Department or other Government witnesses appeared, primarily because they declined to appear in public session. But even so, it soon became evident that much of the institutional work on Chinese and Asian affairs is sponsored or subsidized to some degree or other by the foreign policy agencies of the Federal Government. The Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department and its foreign aid agency, and the Department of Defense spend tens of millions each year for academic research. Beyond that, we have encountered the problem of professors who appreciate—as do you—that expert knowledge of foreign policy requires a familiarity that often must be obtained by working for a foreign policy agency if not full time, then at least as a consultant.

The influence of present or potential contracts, and of present or potential "consultancies" is one of the problems that will grow as academicians are brought into foreign policy formulation. It will grow for the

Congress and the public, too, as we seek judgments of international affairs that will be unencumbered by association with the agency that devised the policy under review.

PROBLEM OF INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY OPINIONS

I would like to take you to a few examples of the difficulty this relationship poses for some of us in the Senate. The Foreign Relations Committee has a special responsibility, in my opinion, not only to consider the evidence and testimony presented to us by the Department of State, but to consider also the shortcomings in a given policy. In the latter 1950's, we undertook one review of the foreign aid program by contracting with several universities and private consulting agencies to survey various aspects of foreign aid. The Latin American Subcommittee, of which I am chairman and was then, did the same for Latin American policy.

The role of private enterprise in aid, aid activities of other free nations, and of the Communist bloc, the objectives of U.S. economic assistance, and our military assistance program were among the subject matter surveyed in the foreign aid study. Commodity problems in Latin America, problems of Latin American economic development, and Soviet bloc activities in Latin America were among the topics surveyed by contract for my subcommittee.

We know now, but did not know then, that the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Center for International Studies, which received one of these contracts, had been founded a few years before primarily through a CIA grant. The MIT Center did the survey of the economic objectives of foreign aid. I was reminded of this study just a few days ago, when the CIA man in charge of the Michigan State project was quoted as saying "there is nothing sinister in using foreign aid as a CIA cover nor in using universities as CIA covers." We still do not know how many other of our contractors received financial support from CIA, DOD, or other Federal agencies in the foreign policy field.

This week, MIT announced that it would drop its CIA contracts. According to its director, Max Millikan, its contracts related to research on Communism and China. The amount of cash represented by current CIA contracts for the MIT Center is classified.

I may say that if we on the committee were gullible then, we are not so gullible now. During the China hearings, it became the practice to ask each witness the extent of his personal relations with Government agencies, and the extent to which his institution was subsidized by Government agencies. As Senator FULBRIGHT put it to one: "I am trying to find out how independent a witness you are."

This particular witness was both a university faculty member and a leading analyst for a Washington institute financed almost entirely by the Defense Department. Indeed, one man who has been in and out of the Defense Department, the academic world, and private institutes, explains that the relationship is so incestuous that it scarcely matters which payroll he is on.

MICHIGAN STATE AND VIETNAM

By far the most dramatic of these episodes has been the Michigan State adventure in South Vietnam. I will not go into the facts of that project, which are now widely known. But it is a matter of increasing concern that the Michigan State administrators seem to view the role of their Center for International Programs not as an educational program but as an operations arm of national foreign policy agencies. The coordinator of the MSU Vietnam project, Stanley Sheinbaum, who caused the facts of that project to be published, draws a conclusion from them that must be considered, whether his description of what transpired is questioned or not. He states:

"The Michigan State professors performed at all levels. They advised on fingerprinting techniques, on bookkeeping, on governmental budgeting and on the very writing of South Vietnam's constitution. One was even instrumental in the choice of the President of South Vietnam. But in all this they never questioned U.S. foreign policy which had placed them there and which, thereby, they were supporting.

"The following article on MSU's involvement in Vietnam is merely a case study of two critical failures in American education and intellectual life today. The first and more obvious is the diversion of the university away from its functions and duties of scholarship and teaching. The second has to do with the failure of the academic intellectual to serve as critic, conscience, ombudsman. Especially in foreign policy, which henceforth will bear heavily on our very way of life at home, is this failure serious.

"For this failure has left us in a state of drift. We lack historical perspective. We have been conditioned by our social science training not to ask the normative question; we possess neither the inclination nor the means with which to question and judge our foreign policy. We have only the capacity to be experts and technicians to serve that policy. This is the tragedy of the Michigan State professors; we were all automatic cold warriors.

"On every campus from Harvard to Michigan State, the story is the same. The social science professor, trained (not educated) to avoid the bigger problems, is off campus expertising for his Government or industry client whose assumptions he readily adopts. Where is the source of serious intellectual criticism that would help us avoid future Vietnams? Serious ideological controversy is dead and with it the perspective for judgment."

I hope that Mr. Sheinbaum is wrong in saying that controversy is dead. The teach-in movement last year on many campuses—which I encouraged and in which I participated on several campuses including the University of Oregon—encourages me to think it is not dead. The teach-in a year ago at Rutgers was reported in the campus newspaper with an outpouring of enthusiasm, not so much for what was said as for the all-night faculty-student intellectual free-for-all which led one student to say of it: "This was the first time I felt that I knew what a real university is."

But there is a price for independence. In the period of 1959, 1960, and 1961, the University of Oregon and Oregon State University both received foreign aid contracts in Asian countries. It was given to the University of Oregon to advise on economic planning by South Korea, and to Oregon State to advise on agricultural education techniques in Thailand. Both groups were highly critical of the performance of the local government, and of AID for extending aid, anyway. "Political reasons" were overriding. The contracts were not renewed, for AID does not care to employ persistent critics any more than anyone else does. But it was the findings of these two schools with which I have close ties that prompted me to begin looking into aspects of foreign aid that I had not previously considered.

Perhaps my personal reaction was the only result of these contracts at the time. But I am only now beginning to feel that the whole question of employing academicians for this job deserves rethinking. How many university groups sacrifice their contracts for these intellectual conclusions and how many become the action arm for the program in order to sustain the contract?

ACADEMIC RESEARCH ABROAD

Another example that aroused many of us on the Foreign Relations Committee last year was the Camelot episode. It was not until local repercussions in Chile had come to the

attention of the American Ambassador that we knew American University was under contract to the Department of the Army to study social conditions in Chile that might lead to unstable political conditions. In layman's language, the purpose of Project Camelot and others like it is to survey a country to get a line on its potential for revolution, and how it can be headed off or countered. Last summer we were given to understand that between 40 and 50 of these studies in foreign countries were being financed by the military agencies.

Camelot was canceled, and an agreement was entered into between the State and Defense Departments that henceforth the studies would proceed only upon the approval of the State Department.

But the Special Operations Research Office at American University continues for this purpose. Its Director described its purpose as: "the relationships with the peoples of the developing countries and deals with problems of aiding in the orderly process of social change and national development which is of concern to the U.S. Military Establishment."

For studying the "orderly process of social change and national development which is of concern to the U.S. Military Establishment" the Army budgeted \$2,463,000 to the Special Operations Research Office in fiscal year 1966. In both Vietnam and the Dominican Republic the orderly process of social change and national development has required large numbers of U.S. troops, for it is the Military Establishment's idea of what is orderly that is coming to dominate American foreign policy in the undeveloped parts of the world.

And for this the academic world is being drawn in not to advise but to implement. The entire Defense Department budget for research on behavioral and social sciences came to nearly \$23 million in fiscal year 1966. The CIA budget is classified. But these sums cannot help but raise the question of the independence of the results they produce.

INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION ACT

It is into this picture that the administration has brought its proposal for a new International Education Act, and to discuss this aspect of academic research and foreign policy I shall put on my hat as chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Education, to which the bill was referred.

Its short title is: "To provide for the strengthening of American educational resources for international studies and research."

The purpose of the bill is to provide Federal assistance to institutions of higher education to strengthen their international studies programs at the graduate level. The bill carries no specific amount for this purpose, but we are told that about \$10 million a year is expected to be spent under it.

The objective is laudatory. But will the results be laudatory? That is the question we are going into in our subcommittee when we take up this bill. Does it mean that another \$10 million will be added to the existing funds for Defense and CIA research? Does putting the Office of Education in charge of allocating the money mean the centers so financed will remain reasonably pure in their research activities? Or does the permission contained in the bill to "utilize the services and facilities of any agency of the Federal Government" mean that the graduate centers so aided will merely become another front for the CIA and the DOD?

There are some of us who feel that aid to education through the Office of Education, as distinct from a grant or contract for a specific purpose from the Defense Department, AID, or CIA, may be sufficiently divorced from special purposes and sufficiently free from ties to a particular policy to be

worthwhile. But the bill will have to be much more carefully drafted than it is now if that result from it is to be achieved.

These remarks admittedly have dwelt on the dangers of directly subsidized academic work in foreign policy. They have not gone into the virtues of such subsidies, and I think there may be some in that public knowledge in these fields is advanced. I hope I have not left you with the idea that I have no confidence at all in the intellectual freedom of the academic world, for I continue to regard it as one of the central and stalwart elements in the checks and balances of our free society.

What I would like to emphasize above all is the problem of public knowledge of the source of these Federal funds, and the purpose for which they were advanced. It is the acceptance of published findings and opinions by a people—and a Congress—unaware of their financial backing that I feel constitutes the danger to foreign policy formulation. And it is an emphasis and preoccupation with operations rather than scholarship and teaching that constitutes the danger to our educational institutions from extensive governmental support.

Acknowledgment of sources, however, raises questions beyond those of financial support. Last week, Senator FULBRIGHT called to public attention the leading article in the Nation's most respected foreign policy publication, the Foreign Affairs Quarterly, which argued that the Vietcong should not be included in any negotiations in Vietnam because it is a Communist front for Hanoi. The author was described by Foreign Affairs as a "student of Asia." I wonder how many of you here who are students of Asia, as I am, could publish in Foreign Affairs on that basis. But this particular student of Asia, George Carver, Jr., is also a leading Vietnam expert of the Central Intelligence Agency, a part of his qualifications that was not mentioned by Foreign Affairs.

In his letter to the Central Intelligence Agency, Senator FULBRIGHT raised on behalf of the committee the following issues as to the role of Agency employees in engaging in activities designed to influence foreign policy attitudes in the United States: "Was Mr. Carver encouraged by the Agency to write this article? Did the author use information available to him only by reason of his employment? Did the Agency approve the article? Would the Agency have approved the article if it had been critical of administration policy? Would their employee have been free to write a critical article for publication; and why was his official connection with the Government not made public? How many other Agency employees have written articles in their field of interest for publication in the United States without attribution? How is this kind of activity related to the role of the Agency as an information gathering institution?"

The CIA's explanation was that Foreign Affairs requested the article. But it had nothing to say about the implication that the public was exposed to a vital argument of American policy without knowing who was really responsible for it.

What is coming out of all this is a growing attitude of "Let the reader beware." Let the public beware, let the Congress beware, that anything it reads these days is reasonably free from the intellectual baggage of direct self-interest.

These are some of the doubts that I must express to you on the subject of academic research and foreign policy. I have not resolved them at all, and in fact, have probably not thought them through, from the standpoint of foreign policy formulation.

From the standpoint of higher education, I do believe that the desire of educational institutions to become operating arms of foreign policy is leading to bad practices and bad results. That may be foreign policy, but it is not education.

I would like to see the academic community survey this subject itself. I would like to hear the pros and cons of the criticisms I have made. I would like to feel that there is some recognition within the academic social sciences of the dangers involved in Federal financing, and that perhaps some self-policing is in order.

The "credibility gap" between Government and governed is already wider than is safe for our free institutions. More than any others, the academic community should be on guard against this gap because the efficacy of intellectual freedom requires not only a speaker but a listener. The audience of the academic community consists of the student and the public. To the extent that either audience becomes cynical and unbelieving, academic research will lose its impact on the formulation of foreign policy.